RésuméL'analyse non‐standard fournit une base solide à la théorie des infinitésimaux. L'approche axiomatique qu'en donne Nelson est basée sur un nouveau predicat qui est ajouté au langage de la théorie usuelle des ensembles. Nous interprétons ce prédicat et formulons les axio‐mes de Nelson ?on;une façon qui peut être comparee à la discussion de P. R. Halmos dans son livre Naïve Set Theory .SummaryNon‐standard analysis gives a proper foundation to the theory of infinitesimals. Nelson's axiomatic approach of it uses a new (...) predicate which is added to the classical language of set theory. We interpret this new predicate and formulate Nelson's axioms in a way that can be compared to P. R. Halmos' discussion of set axioms in his book Naïve Set Theory .ZusammenfassungDie nicht‐standard Analyse liefert eine solide Grundlage für die Theorie der infinitesimalen Grössen. Die von Nelson vorgeschlagene Axiomatisierung beruht auf einem neuen Prädikat, das den in der Sprache der Mengentheorie üblichen hinzugefügt wird. Wir interpretieren dieses Prädikat und formulieren Nelsons Axiome auf eine Art, die mit der Diskus‐sion von P.R. Halmos in Naïve Set Theory verglichen werden kann. (shrink)

RésuméLe saint — phénomène religieux universel — est compris comme un personnage à travers lequel un Absolu se manifeste au sein du relatif: le saint représente le fondement transcendant d'une société. Ce fait détermine ses relations avec la dernière: libéré des contraintes habituelles d'ordre transactionnel qui régissent la société, le saint en assure l'équilibre en intervenant comme arbitre lors de conflits graves — en particulier en période de crise —, ou comme directeur des consciences. En faisant de lui un objet (...) de vénération et en l'utilisant comme référence et justification ultimes de sa propre existence, la société essaie de l'intégrer dans ses structures. Toutefois, la dimension d'Absolu demeurent irréductible au relatif, la présence du saint conduit immanquablement à l'élaboration de diverses théories concernant l'existence de deux niveaux de vérité.SummaryThe saint is understood as a universal phenomenon in religion and defined as a person through which absolute Reality manifests itself in the midst of relative reality: the saint represents the transcendental foundation of society. Standing outside and above the constraints deriving from the transactional pattern of social life, the saint acts as an arbiter in cases of major conflicts and as a spiritual guide, and thus assures harmony and peace among the members of society. Society tries to get possession of the saint by making him an object of veneration and by considering him as the ultimate reference and justification of its existence. However, absolute Reality being forever irreducible to relative reality, the saint's presence leads inevitably to the elaboration of theories concerning two levels of truth.ZusammenfassungDer “Heilige” ist ein universelles religiöses Phänomen; er kann definiert werden als ein Mensch, in welchem sich das Absolute innerhalb des Relativen manifestiert: der Heilige repräsentiert die transzendente Grundlage einer Gesellschaft. Diese Tat‐sache bestimmt seine Beziehungen zu der letzteren: der Heilige ist befreit von den transaktionellen Zwängen, die das Gesellschaftsleben beherrschen und ist dadurch befähigt, in schwierigen Konfliktsfällen als Schiedsrichter zu wirken , sowie als geistlicher Führer zu amten. Indem die Gesellschaft ihm ihre Verehrung darbringt und ihn als letzte Begründung und Rechtfertigung ihrer Existenz betrachtet, versucht sie, ihn in ihre Strukturen hereinzuholen. Da indessen das Absolute nie im Relativen aufgeht, führt das Dasein des Heiligen unweigerlich zur Aus‐bildung verschiedener Theorien hinsichtlich der Existenz einer doppelten Wahrheit. (shrink)

It's a common idea in philosophy that we possess a peculiar kind of "phenomenal concept" by which we can think about our conscious states in "inner" and "direct" ways, as for example, when I attend to the way a current pain feels and think about this feeling as such. Such phenomenal ways of thinking figure in a variety of theoretical contexts. The bulk of this article discusses their use in a certain strategy – the phenomenal concept strategy – for defending (...) the physicalist view that conscious states are reducible to brain states. It also considers, more briefly, how phenomenal concepts have been used to defend dualism about consciousness, and how they have been used to explain our special access to our consciousness. It concludes with a discussion about whether, and in what more precise sense of the term, we at all possess "phenomenal concepts" of our conscious states. (shrink)

According to a widely held physicalist view, consciousness is identical with some physical or functional phenomenon just as liquidity is identical with loose molecular connection. To many of us, this claim about consciousness seems more problematic than the claim about liquidity. To many—including many physicalists—the identification of consciousness with some physical phenomenon even seems “absurd” or “crazy”. A full defence of physicalism should explain why the allegedly correct hypothesis comes across this way. If physicalism is true and we have reason (...) to accept it, why does it seem “absurd”? One possibility is that this is fully explained by the fact that we have an erroneous understanding of consciousness or its physical basis. This explanation is embraced by few if any physicalists. It is rejected by many, including proponents of the “phenomenal concept strategy”, which lately has become the dominant strategy for defending physicalism. But the “error explanation” is clearly the most plausible explanation that is available to physicalists. So this paper argues. (shrink)

RésuméLa sélection du matériel biologique, sa préparation en vue de ľapplication de diverses techniques?on;investigation de plus en plus sophistiquées ainsi qu'un univers experimental bien déterminé vont contraindre le chercheur à travailler sur un modèle parfois éloigné de son contexte biologique propre. Aussi la signification des résultats obtenus doit être de plus en plus discutée en fonction des limites imposées, non seulement par les techniques, mais également par le modèle même de recherche choisi.SummaryThe selection of the biological material, its preparation for (...) the application of several techniques more and more complex and selected experimental conditions strain the biologist to use biological samples sometimes removed of their environment. The discussion of the results obtained must be done carefully and not only in function of the technical limitations but also in function of the limits due to the experimental material itself.ZusammenfassungDie Auswahl des biologischen Materials, seine Vorbereitung im Hinblick auf die Anwendung auf immer kompliziertere Untersuchungstechniken sowie ein wohlbestimmter Experimentier‐bereich werden den Forscher zwingen, mit einem Modell zu arbeiten, das gelegentlich weit von seinem eigentlichen biologischen Kontext entfernt ist. Deshalb muss die Bedeutung der erhaltenen Ergebnisse immer mehr mit Riicksicht auf die Grenzen diskutiert werden, die nicht allein durch die Techniken, sondern auch durch das Forschungsmodell selbst gesetzt werden. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have recently argued that consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. This paper examines David Papineau’s influential version of this view. According to Papineau, the difference between our “phenomenal” and “material” concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts (...) can’t co-refer. I claim that this account fails. To begin with, it is arguable that we are mystified about physicalism even when the account predicts that we shouldn’t be. Further, and worse, the account predicts that an “intuition of distinctness” will arise in cases where it clearly does not. In conclusion, I make some remarks on the prospects for, constraints on, and alternatives to, a successful defence of the claim. (shrink)

This paper articulates a case for supposing that all shades of colour are visually complex.

Language Use offers a philosophical examination of the basic conceptual framework of pragmatic theory, and contrasts this framework with detailed descriptions of our everyday practices of language use. While the results should be highly relevant to pragmatics, the investigation is not a contribution to pragmatic theory. Drawing on Ludwig Wittgenstein's approach to philosophical problems, Language Use brings out the relevance of Wittgenstein's methods to fundamental problems in central pragmatic fields of research such as deixis, implicatures, speech acts and presuppositions.

Although the notion of natural behavior occurs in many policy-making and legal documents on animal welfare, no consensus has been reached concerning its definition. This paper argues that one reason why the notion resists unanimously accepted definition is that natural behavior is not properly a biological concept, although it aspires to be one, but rather a philosophical tendency to perceive animal behavior in accordance with certain dichotomies between nature and culture, animal and human, original orders and invented artifacts. The paper (...) scrutinizes the philosophy of natural behavior as it developed in the organic movement in response to a perceived contrast between industrialized and traditional agriculture. There are two reasons for focusing on the organic movement: (i) the emphasis on “the natural” is most accentuated there and has a long history, (ii) everyday life on organic farms presupposes human/animal interplay, which conflicts with the philosophical tendency to separate nature from culture. This mismatch between theory and practice helps us see why, and how, the philosophy of natural behavior needs to be reconsidered. The paper proposes that we understand farms as local human/animal cultures, and asks what we can mean my natural behavior in such contexts. Since domestic animals adapt to agricultural environments via interaction with caretakers, such interplay is analyzed as “hub” in these animals’ natural behavior. (shrink)

This paper develops a proposal about phenomenal consciousness that is (somewhat) eliminativist in two respects. First, regarded in the light of some common ways of conceiving of consciousness, the proposal is "deflationary". Second, it opens up space for a development in which what we now naturally think about as consciousness turns out to be many different things.

RésuméContrairement à ce que pourrait donner à penser la these de E. Mayr sur ľimportance actuelle des explications évolutives en biologie, par opposition aux explications fonctionnelles, ľauteur soutient que, pour ľépistémologie de la causalité, le second type ?on;explication reste plus significatif que le premier. II tente de le montrer en reprenant brièvement son analyse des travaux de P.E. Pilet sur les inhibiteurs de croissance , telle qu'elle a ete présentée dans quatre articles antérieurs.SummaryStarting from E. Mayr's distinction between functional and (...) evolutionary explanation, the author suggests that, as far as the epistemological analysis of causality is concerned, the former type of explanation remains of more interest than the latter. He illustrates this claim by briefly taking up his philosophical and logico‐linguistic study of P.E. Pilet's work on growth inhibitors in the field of plant growth regulation, which was presented in a series of four previous papers.ZusammenfassungVon E. Mayrs Unterscheidung zwischen funktionaler und evolutiver Erklärung ausgehend, weist der Autor nach, dass die erste Art der Erklärung in bezug auf die erkenntnistheoretische Analyse der Kansalität mehr Bedeutung hat. Er versucht aufgrund seiner früheren Analysen von P.E. Pilets Schriften über Wachstumsinhibitoren auf dem Gebiet der Wachstumsregulation von Pflanzen diese Auffassung zu erhärten. (shrink)

RésuméLa scission ressentie aujourd'hui entre une recherche dite fondamentale, supposée desintéressée, et une recherche de caractère appliqué orientée vers une production, ne repose pas lant sur des differénces de méthode que sur la motivation du chercheur. Les problèmes liés àľessor actuel des applications de la biologie, en particulier à celui des ≤biotechnologies≥, permettent de poser la question de la fécondité du savoir dans un contexte dialectique liant indissociablement ľacte réalisateur aux processus cognitifs.SummaryIt is often felt that there exists a division (...) between research referred to as fundamental – assumed to be disinterested – and research of an applied nature – which is orientated towards a production. This dichotomy is not based so much upon methodological differences as upon the research worker's attitude and motives. The problems associated with the actual rise of applications of biology, particularly those termed ≤biotechnologies≥, allows one to examine the question of knowledge's fruitfulness in a dialectical context joining irreversibly concrete actions to cognitive processes.ZusammenfassungDie heutzutage empfundene Spaltung zwischen einer uneigennützig gemeinten sogenannten Grundforschung und einer auf Produktion eingestellten angewandten Forschung beruht auf Unterschieden weniger in der Methode des Forschers als vielmehr in dessen Motivation. Die Pro‐bleme, die mit dem gegenwärtigen Aufschwung der Anwendungen der Biologie verbunden sind, führen dazu, die Frage der FYuchtbarkeit des Wissens in einen dialektischen Kontext zu stellen, der die verwirklichende Tat unlSsbar mit den Erkenntnisprozessen verbindet. (shrink)

A strong form of representationalism says that every conscious property of every mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. A weaker representationalism says that some conscious property of some mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. David Papineau has recently argued that all such theories are incorrect since they construe consciousness as consisting in “relations to propositions or other abstract objects outside space and time”, whereas consciousness is “concrete” (...) and “here and now”. Papineau defends instead a kind of “qualia theory” according to which all conscious properties are intrinsic non-relational properties of subjects. He argues that this theory bypasses the difficulties he identifies for representationalism. Similar worries about representationalism, and similar ideas to the effect that some qualia theory, adverbial theory, or sense-datum theory fares better with respect to these worries are relatively wide-spread. I argue that Papineau’s theory does not bypass the difficulties he identifies for representationalism. In fact, Papineau’s theory arguably has no advantage at all over representationalism with regard to these issues. The features that concern Papineau about representationalist views do not derive—or do not derive solely—from the representationalism of these views. They derive from a common-factorism of these views. And this common-factorism is embraced by Papineau as well as by most theories of consciousness and perception. (shrink)

In recent years, many philosophers and scientists have argued or accepted that it is impossible to learn primitive sensory concepts like “blue” and “red”. This paper defends a more qualified picture. I try to show that some received characterisations of “learning” are nonequivalent and point towards different learning-nonlearning distinctions. And, on some ways of specifying such a distinction, it might be correct that we do not and cannot “learn” a concept of blue. But on other ways of specifying such a (...) distinction, we can and do sometimes “learn” a concept of blue from experiences of blue. The latter part of the argument connects with some traditional “abstractionist” views, and I defend the present claims in view of some widely circulated concerns about “abstracting” concepts from experience. I close with some reflections on how one might, in view of all this, think about “the learning-nonlearning distinction”. (shrink)

RésuméĽenzymologie est une discipline scientifique apparue au debut du siècle dernier. Les techniques de plus en plus élaborées qui en ont depuis lors permis le développement, faisant appel à une rigueur expérimentale toujours plus évidente, pourraient suggérer un recul de la réalite biologique et physiologique au profit de modéles abstraits. La présentation de quelques exemples montre que ce point de vue n'est pas fondé.SummaryThe infancy of enzymology dates back to the beginning of the 19th century. The experimental techniques which have (...) subsequently been developed in this field of biochemistry might now suggest a prevalence of abstract models over biological and physiological relevance.Several pertinent examples show that such a view is unjustified.ZusammenfassungDie Anfänge der Enzymologie als wissenschaftliche Disziplin gehen bis auf das frühe 19. Jahrhundert zurück. Die experimentelle Methodik, die auf diesem Gebiet der Biochemie entwickelt wurde, deutet auf eine Bevorzugung abstrakter Modelle gegenüber der biologischen Wirklichkeit.Einige Beispiele sollen zeigen, dass diese Ansicht unbegründet ist. (shrink)

This paper investigates forms of metaphysical vertigo that can appear when contrasts between humans and animals are challenged. Distinguishing three forms of vertigo and four ways of differentiating humans and animals, the paper attempts to achieve a perspicuous representation of what could be termed “the difficulty of being humans when we are animals”; or alternatively, “the difficulty of being animals when we are humans”.

A visual experience, as understood here, is a sensory event that is conscious, or like something to undergo. This chapter focuses on three issues concerning such experiences. The first issue is the so-called ‘transparency’ of experiences. The chapter distinguishes a number of different interpretations of the suggestion that visual experiences are ‘transparent’. It then discusses in what sense, if any, visual experiences are ‘transparent’, and what further conclusions one can draw from that. The second issue is which properties we are (...) presented with in visual experiences. It is widely accepted that we sometimes experience red for example. But exactly which properties do we sometimes visually experience, and which properties do we never visually experience? The third issue is which particulars, if any, we are presented with in visual experiences. Do we for example sometimes visually experience mind-independent particulars like trees? Do we sometimes visually experience mind-dependent, particular ‘sense-data’? (shrink)

Colours and consciousness both present us with metaphysical problems. But what exactly are the problems? According to standard accounts, they are roughly the following. On the one hand, we have reason to believe, about both colour and consciousness, that they are identical with some familiar natural phenomena. But on the other hand, it is hard to see how these identities could obtain. I argue that this is an adequate characterisation of our metaphysical problem of colour, but a mischaracterisation of the (...) problem of consciousness. It mischaracterises the problem by presenting consciousness as more 'colour-like' than we have reason to take it to be. The real problem of consciousness is, I suggest, that almost nothing theoretically useful is known about this phenomenon at present. I also explore some implications of this perspective on the problem of consciousness. Given the shape of the problem, I argue that we can't rule out all forms of eliminativism about consciousness. Nor can we rule out that future research will close the ' explanatory gap' that consciousness gives rise to. (shrink)

A strong form of representationalism says that every conscious property of every mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. A weaker representationalism says that some conscious property of some mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. David Papineau has recently argued that all such theories are incorrect since they construe consciousness as consisting in “relations to propositions or other abstract objects outside space and time”, whereas consciousness is “concrete” (...) and “here and now”. Papineau defends instead a kind of “qualia theory” according to which all conscious properties are intrinsic non-relational properties of subjects. He argues that this theory bypasses the difficulties he identifies for representationalism. Similar worries about representationalism, and similar ideas to the effect that some qualia theory, adverbial theory, or sense-datum theory fares better with respect to these worries are relatively wide-spread. I argue that Papineau’s theory does not bypass the difficulties he identifies for representationalism. In fact, Papineau’s theory arguably has no advantage at all over representationalism with regard to these issues. The features that concern Papineau about representationalist views do not derive—or do not derive solely—from the representationalism of these views. They derive from a common-factorism of these views. And this common-factorism is embraced by Papineau as well as by most theories of consciousness and perception. (shrink)

In recent years, many philosophers and scientists have argued or accepted that it is impossible to learn primitive sensory concepts like “blue” and “red”. This paper defends a more qualified picture. I try to show that some received characterisations of “learning” are nonequivalent and point towards different learning-nonlearning distinctions. And, on some ways of specifying such a distinction, it might be correct that we do not and cannot “learn” a concept of blue. But on other ways of specifying such a (...) distinction, we can and do sometimes “learn” a concept of blue from experiences of blue. The latter part of the argument connects with some traditional “abstractionist” views, and I defend the present claims in view of some widely circulated concerns about “abstracting” concepts from experience. I close with some reflections on how one might, in view of all this, think about “the learning-nonlearning distinction”. (shrink)

RésuméOn examine ?on;abord les termes explicites et implicites du contrat de justice selon Rawls. Ensuite on rappelle ľinterprétation ‘procédurale’ que ce dernier donne de ľautonomie kantienne et ľon montre ľinanité de cette interprétation. Cependant la doctrine de Rawls exprime avec bon‐heur une conception sceptique de la justice.SummaryAfter a short examination of the explicit and implicit contract of justice according to Rawls, the reasons afforded by him to give a Kantian foundation to the contract are recalled and rebutted. However Rawls's doctrine (...) remarkably expresses the main argument of a sceptical conception of justice.ZusammenfassungNach einer kurzen Untersuchung des expliziten und impliziten Begriffs des Gesellschaftsver‐trages, wie Rawls ihn versteht, wird die besondere Interpretation erOrtert, die er vom Kantschen Autonomiebegriff gibt. Es wird gezeigt, dass diese unzutreffend ist und dass Rawls Lehre eher auf eine skeptische Auffassung der Gerechtigkeit zutrifft. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to understand and assess Thomas Nagel's influential case against physicalism in the philosophy of mind. I show that Nagel has claimed that experience is "subjective", or "essentially connected with a single point of view" in at least three different senses: first, in the sense that it is essential to every experience that there be something it is like to have it; second, in the sense that what an experience is like for its possessor cannot be (...) understood by a radically different type of organism; and third, in the sense that an experience cannot be "apprehended" or "observed" from a third-person perspective. I also show that these three claims have entered into two different arguments for his view that experience cannot be accounted for in physicalist terms. By way of assessment, I suggest that physicalists have decent resources for responding to the second and third of Nagel's claims about the subjectivity of experience, but that they currently have less convincing things to say about the first claim. (shrink)

RésuméCet exposé repose essentiellement sur des idées originates déjà développées par ľauteur. En fait, les concepts en cause, à savoir ľévolution prébiotique et biotique, ainsi que la sénescence et le cancer, sont rassemblés dans une théorie profoundément unitaire résultant, soit de ľaccroissement, soit de la diminution, du poids moléculaire du DNA.Ceci s'apparente singulièrement à la révolution de la physique dans ce premier quart de siècle qui a conduit àľélaboration de la théorie de la relativité et de la mécanique ondulatoire.SummaryThis paper (...) is based essentially on original ideas already developed by the author. In fact the concepts considered, that is to say prebiotic and biotic evolution as well as ageing and cancer, are brought together into a highly unified theory resulting from the increase or the lowering of the molecular weight of DNA.This is closely in agreement with the revolution in physics which took place in the first quarter of this century and which led both to the theory of relativity and of wave mechanics.ZusammenfassungDie Arbeit beruht im wesentlichen auf vom Verfasser schon früher entwickelten Originalge‐danken. Die involvierten Begriffe, die vorbiotische und die biotische Evolution sowie das Altern und die Wucherung, finden sich in der Tat in einer einheitlichen Theorie vereinigt, die aus der Zunahme oder Abnahme des Molekulargewichts des DNA resultiert.Dies stimmt auffällig mit der Revolution in der Physik überein, die im ersten Viertel unseres Jahrhunderts zur Ausarbeitung der Relativitätstheorie und der Wellenmechanik geführt hat. (shrink)

‘Spirituality’ is an old word which throughout history has been given different meanings. Over the last two decades, it has successively become an increasingly frequent concept in scientific studies, none the least in psychosocial oncology. Advocates of ‘spirituality’ regard it as a human dimension and state that since all humans have ‘spiritual needs’ it is urgent to develop ‘spiritual care’. With the focus on recent publications, this article critically scrutinizes aspects of scientific soundness in this growing research tradition, foremost problems (...) of the lack of conceptual clarity and reliance on interconnected instruments that imply circular findings. It is concluded that the concept adds more confusion than clarity if it is not put into a meaningful theoretical and cultural context, and subsequently it is important to guard against preconceptions and vague meanings in this research field. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to understand and assess Thomas Nagel's influential case against physicalism in the philosophy of mind. I show that Nagel has claimed that experience is "subjective", or "essentially connected with a single point of view" in at least three different senses: first, in the sense that it is essential to every experience that there be something it is like to have it; second, in the sense that what an experience is like for its possessor cannot be (...) understood by a radically different type of organism; and third, in the sense that an experience cannot be "apprehended" or "observed" from a third-person perspective. I also show that these three claims have entered into two different arguments for his view that experience cannot be accounted for in physicalist terms. By way of assessment, I suggest that physicalists have decent resources for responding to the second and third of Nagel's claims about the subjectivity of experience, but that they currently have less convincing things to say about the first claim. (shrink)

What could you learn if you saw a colour after being confined from birth to a black-and-white room? It turns out that this is surprisingly hard to say. I suggest that reflection on this question teaches us that colour perception has a richer content than we might have thought.